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Abstract: In this paper, a framework for risk management at railways has been studied and integrated 
into global safety management system of railways. Furthermore we studied how it was applied to a 
manually controlled full barrier road rail level crossing in Morocco. We studied different aspects that 
should be considered during the system definition phase where we suggested using functional diagrams 
for modeling operations at LC from the perspective of LC actors. It is a critical part for risk management 
and specifically for hazard identification where we provided different techniques that can be used; our 
experience shows that involvement of all stakeholders is a prerequisite to the success to this phase. 
Initiating events can be unveiled through brainstorming sessions and FTA can model complex 
interactions of events that have the potential to lead to accidents. Risk analysis can then be carried out 
provided that historical LC accident and incident data is available to estimate frequencies and 
consequences; ETA is the ideal tool for estimating consequences of hazards due to multiple causes. The 
existing risks are then classified and decisions are made regarding their tolerability, the ALARP principle 
can serve this purpose. A cost benefit analysis then helps prioritize risk treatment actions that should 
target intolerable risks. Control mechanisms should be also put in place to assess, monitor and review the 
risk control actions put in place. Finally, it is emphasized on the importance of having a database of 
historical accidents and incidents at LC for the success and efficiency for the suggested framework. 
Accidents at level crossings are the result of complex interactions between factors arising from the design 
and operations of level crossings. An important first step towards eliminating the causes of these 
accidents is thru understanding and assessing the risks associated with a given level crossing and acting 
on them. This paper presents review based study on risk management framework that serves this 
purpose.  
INTRODUCTION 
There is the potential for instability and confusion 
in the railway industry resulting in an overall 
increase in accident risk. These changes affect not 
only the organizational and technical innovations 
developed with the new systems, but also the new 
stakeholders and financial arrangements derived 
from the major changes. Railway safety is even 
more questionable at road rail level crossing (LC) 
where the number of fatal accidents has been 
significant over the years. A major concern is to 
understand and remove the risks in railway 
operations in general and at LC in particular. The 
subject of risk has increasingly become a point of 
shared interest between many entities representing 
different sectors. According to a definition of the 
United Nations, risk ―refers to the expected losses 
from a particular hazard to a specified element at 
risk in a particular future time period. Losses may 
be estimated in terms of human lives, or 
infrastructure damaged or in financial terms‖.  We 
illustrate how the suggested framework can be 
used for risk assessment at road/rail level crossing. 
The suggested framework could be easily adjusted 
to model risk in other sectors as well. Furthermore, 
we explain how the suggested risk management 
framework can be integrated into a global safety 
management system in the railway sector. 
Risk and the Risk Management Process 
A hazard being considered as source of danger that 
is not associated to the likelihood with which that 
danger will actually lead to negative consequences. 
Quantitative definitions of risk associate hazards 
with their probability of nuisance to the people and 
the environment. For instance, risk is defined to be 
a set of scenarios (Si), each of which having a 
probability (or frequency Pi) and a consequence Ci. 
This quantitative definition to risk aims to estimate 
the degree or probability of loss related directly to 
the occurrence of hazards or potential failures of a 
system. An organization faces essentially three 
different types of risk to its operations, namely 
internal risks, i.e. those associated with activities 
and locations for which the organization is solely 
responsible, external risks, i.e. those originating 
from systems, people or organizations and 
processes that are outside the organization‘s 
control and shared risks, i.e. risks associated with 
activities or locations for which there are shared 
responsibilities rather than sole ownership; to 
manage such risks the organizations have to ensure 
that compatible approaches are used. The need for 
practical assistance in applying risk management 
in public and private sector organizations, has led 
to the development of standards on risk 
management. 
Amit Garg* et al. 
 (IJITR) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
Volume No.8, Issue No.4, June - July 2020, 9531-9539.  
2320 –5547 @ 2013-2020 http://www.ijitr.com All rights Reserved. Page | 9532 
 
 
Existing Hazard Identification Techniques 
Most of the time, it is performed first, prior to or as 
an initial step of design, operation, maintenance, 
and refurbishment. PHA is carried out in four main 
step beginning with PHA prerequisites where the 
PHA team is established, the system to be 
analyzed, its components, boundaries and 
interactions are defined and described as well as 
the actors or materials that appear to be the most 
exposed to risk. Next, all hazards and possible 
accidental events must be identified. In the third 
step of PHA, the consequence or severity of the 
hazards in terms of infrastructure damage, human 
injury or loss is evaluated and frequency of those 
identified hazards is also estimated. Severity and 
frequency classification may be used instead when 
historical risk data is not available to make 
accurate estimations. Finally, the different hazards 
are ranked in categories based on their severities 
and frequencies; this may be done through the 
application of the ALARP principle explained. 
Hazard categorization helps identify which 
measures and follow up actions should be carried 
out to remove hazards associated with high risk. 
Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) is a methodology to identify and 
analyze all potential failure modes of the various 
parts of a system, the effects these failures may 
have on the system and how to avoid the failures, 
and/or mitigate the effects of the failures on the 
system. FMEA (Failure modes and effects 
analysis) is a predecessor to FMECA. The C in 
FMECA indicates that the criticality (or severity) 
of the various failure effects are considered and 
ranked. Today, FMEA is often used as a synonym 
for FMECA. Although FMECA was one of the 
first systematic techniques for failure analysis, it is 
not able to identity complex failure modes 
involving multiple failures within a subsystem. In 
other words, it has difficulty in identifying hazards 
that are due to complex interactions of failures. 
Furthermore it has a limited examination of human 
error and external influences. FMECA remains the 
most widely used reliability analysis technique in 
the initial stages of product/system development, it 
is usually performed during the conceptual and 
initial design phases of the system in order to 
assure that all potential failure modes have been 
considered and the proper provisions have been 
made to eliminate these failures. A Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and 
systematic examination of a planned or existing 
process or operation in order to identify and 
evaluate problems that may represent risks to 
personnel or equipment, or that may prevent 
efficient operations. The HAZOP technique was 
initially developed to analyze chemical process 
systems, but has later been extended to other types 
of systems and also to complex operations and to 
software systems. HAZOP is a qualitative 
technique which uses special adjectives (such as 
"more,""less," "no," etc.: being a unique feature) 
combined with process conditions (such as speed, 
flow, pressure, etc.) to systematically evaluate 
deviations from normal conditions. HAZOP also 
ranks risk based on severity and likelihood and is 
best suited for the identification of safety hazards 
and operability problems of continuous process 
systems, especially fluid and thermal systems and 
also to review procedures and sequential 
operations. A major limitation of HAZOP and of 
the techniques that we introduced thus far is that 
they focus on one-event causes of deviations. 
Multiple-phase failures or hazards due to complex 
interactions of simple events have to be identified 
based on the hazards previously identified. Several 
tools are available for this purpose, including Fault 
and Event Tree Analysis, Bayesian Belief 
Networks, Cause-Effect Diagrams and Reliability 
Block Diagrams. A Bayesian Network is a directed 
acyclic graphical representation of the joint 
probability distribution for a set of discrete 
variables. To each variable A is attached the 
conditional probability of A given the parents of 
A. The graphical representation makes Bayesian 
networks a flexible tool for constructing models of 
causal impact between events, in particular when 
the causal impact has a random nature. Bayesian 
Networks can be used to model hazards that are 
the result of complex interactions of simple event. 
Risk Analysis 
Risk Analysis consists of the estimation of the 
frequency of the accidental events and their 
respective consequences. The frequency of the 
accidental events may be estimated based on 
historical data of previous incidents, fault tree 
analysis or expert judgment. The consequence 
analysis identifies both immediate consequences 
and those that are not apparent until sometime after 
the accidental event. All potential event chains 
following an accidental event must be identified 
and described. Consequence analysis may be 
conducted using event tree analysis, simulations or 
can be derived from historical data. Cause-
consequence analysis is another technique for 
consequence analysis which explores system 
responses to an initiating "challenge" and enables 
assessment of the probabilities of unfavorable 
outcomes at each of a number of mutually 
exclusive loss levels. This technique provides data 
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similar to that available with an event tree; 
however, it offers two advantages over the event 
tree; time sequencing of events is better portrayed, 
and discrete, staged levels of outcome are 
analyzed. It is important to include all consequence 
categories, these include for the case of level 
crossing, rail company personnel, passengers, the 
environment (road side of LC), the economic 
impact, operational consequences and rail 
company reputation. Losses may be estimated in 
terms of human lives, or infrastructure damaged or 
in financial terms‖ . Loss of Livelihood should 
also be included when estimating losses, livelihood 
being defined as ―the command as individual, 
family or other group has over an income and/or 
bundle of resources that can be used or exchanged 
to satisfy its needs‖ .In the absence of data, one 
can adopt an ordinal scale for hazard frequency 
classification and consequence or severity 
classification.  
Risk Evaluation 
In the risk evaluation step, the existing risks are 
classified and decisions are made regarding the 
tolerability of the existing risk. Risk tolerability is 
generally a complicated and multifaceted issue 
which raises philosophical questions from several 
angles. Epistemologically one is led to ask: How 
can we know exactly what a risk is? (Objective vs. 
Subjective assessment). Ethical and political 
questions include, for instance, the following: Who 
should assess the acceptability of a risk? 
Stakeholders vs. Mathematicians? Another 
question is about distribution of risks in society 
whether the distribution is fair? Several principles 
can be used to determine the acceptable risk: The 
precautionary principle is a moral and political 
principle which states that if an action or policy 
might cause severe or irreversible harm to the 
public, in the absence of a scientific consensus that 
harm would not ensue, the burden of proof falls on 
those who would advocate taking the action. 
GAME or GAMAB meaning ―globally at least 
equivalent‖, can be applied when looking at either 
individual or collective risk. This criterion is based 
on the requirement that the total risk inherent in 
any new system must not exceed the total risk 
inherent in comparable existing systems. It is 
assumed that the risk level of existing systems can 
be assessed (e.g., using existing statistics). The 
respective risk levels of an existing system and a 
new system can only be compared if both systems 
have comparable performance characteristics and 
operating conditions. MEM (minimum 
endogenous mortality) requires that the total risk 
from all technical systems affecting an individual 
must not exceed minimum human mortality (2E-4 
deaths per person per year). 
ALARP principle ensures that the risks of any 
system with serious consequences in terms of 
human loss and injuries, is kept to a level which is 
As Low As is Reasonably Practicable. ALARP 
defines three risk levels: 
• Intolerable Risk, which cannot be justified or 
accepted, except in extra ordinary 
circumstances 
• Tolerable Risk, which can be accepted only if 
risk reduction is impractical or if the cost or 
risk reduction greatly exceeds the benefit 
gained. 
• Negligible Risk, which is broadly acceptable 
and does not require risk mitigating measures 
If risk is determined to be at the intolerable level, 
measures must be taken to reduce it immediately to 
a tolerable level. If risk is found to be at tolerable 
level, risk mitigating measures should still be 
applied, provided that a cost benefit analysis is in 
favor of it.  
 
Risk Treatment and Control 
Risk treatment is the process of selecting and 
implementing measures to reduce see remove the 
risks. Having identified all sources of risks, one 
will need to prioritize risk treatment actions and 
target high risk before low risk while maximizing 
the benefit of the organization. Two major classes 
of methods are considered while prioritizing risk 
treatment actions including Economic Evaluation 
and Social Evaluation. Social Evaluation is usually 
used as a prerequisite to the Economic evaluation 
in decision making as there are a number of factors 
that cannot be assessed economically. The 
Economic Evaluation estimates the expected 
benefits and anticipated costs of control associated 
with varying degrees of reduction in risk, using 
monetary criteria which are amenable to 
quantitative economic analysis. Several types of 
analysis techniques can be used for economic 
evaluation of risk treatment alternatives at level 
crossings including, cost benefit analysis, cost 
effectiveness analysis and risk benefit analysis. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), also termed benefit-
cost analysis or risk-cost-benefit analysis, is a 
technique that compares for various risk reduction 
scenarios, the estimated costs of controls put in 
place against the benefits of the reduced likelihood 
of accident at LC. This technique calculates the 
monetized benefit-cost ratio which indicates, when 
found greater than one (less than one), that projects 
benefits will likely outweigh the cost of the 
controls (costs outweigh the benefits). Non-
economic considerations should help decide when 
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a risk removal strategy with a benefit-cost ratio 
inferior to 1 should still be retained. A major 
difficulty in CBA is that the Costs, Disbenefits and 
Benefits should be translated into their equivalent 
monetary value before the benefit cost ratios can 
be estimated out. It is, however, very difficult to 
estimate and reach agreement on the economic 
impacts of benefits and disbenefits for projects 
intending to put in place controls for risk reduction 
at LC. Furthermore, a viewpoint must be 
established (usually after a strong debate in the 
political arena between different groups) before the 
economic evaluation. The viewpoint finally 
adopted will determine the estimates of costs, 
Benefits and Disbenefits. It should be noted that 
quantification of the benefits of risk reduction 
alternatives in monetary terms is an important part 
of CBA. Various techniques for making 
quantitative estimates can be used including 
revealed preferences and stated preferences 
methods. 
Revealed preference methods allow an analyst to 
infer values from actions, for example one 
revealed  preference method involves measuring 
prices in benefits in two risk reduction alternatives 
that are distinguished only by an externality; for 
example building or not building a bridge to 
replace a given LC, building a bridge may have an 
incidence on the economic value of real estate 
around the LC, this increase or decrease will 
reflect the monetary benefits or disbenefits of 
building the bridge to replace the LC. On the other 
hand, the stated or expressed preference methods 
consist of using psychometric surveys for asking 
people about their preferences. They are used 
especially where no market value actually exists. 
For example, surveys may be used to ask people of 
what they are willing to pay to save a human life. 
This monetary amount can be used to represent 
what people are willing to pay to increase safety at 
a LC. The Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) 
technique compares the projected costs for a range 
of proposed risk control alternatives, all intended 
to meet the same objective. Although 
straightforward, this method does not take into 
account of social and political factors unless they 
can be somehow converted in monetary value. 
CEA differs from CBA in that benefits are 
expressed in physical units (e.g. in LC context, 
number of life to be saved) rather than in money 
units. Costs, as in CBA, are expressed in monetary 
terms. CEA is useful in areas such as health, 
accident safety and education where it is often 
easier to quantify benefits in physical terms than to 
value them in dollars. CEA is useful most often 
when the benefits of a risk reduction scenario are 
difficult to quantify in monetary terms but the 
government wishes to know which option will 
achieve social benefits or government objectives 
most cost effectively. One limitation of CEA is 
that it applies only to situations where all of 
proposed risk control alternatives are intended to 
meet the same physical objective. A Risk benefit 
Analysis calculates the benefits of the proposed 
risk control alternatives as a reduction in estimated 
risk and is not converted to a monetary unit. Risk 
benefit analysis attempts to define the relation 
between a given amount of risk reduction (e.g. 
reduction of frequency of accidents at a LC) and 
the cost of control measures necessary to achieve 
it. Risk benefit analysis is frequently the most 
credible risk management technique when 
attempting to control high risk situations (e.g. risk 
of contamination due to transportation of high-risk 
contaminants). It is wider in scope than the cost 
effectiveness analysis. A notable advantage of risk 
benefit analysis is that it does not require the 
conversion of the benefit into monetary measures. 
It requires, however, a prior determination of what 
an acceptable level of risks. 
Monitoring and Reviewing the Risk Management 
Process 
Monitoring and review of the risk management 
process is a mean to make sure that the actions 
taken effective and that the procedures adopted 
and information gathered throughout the process 
were appropriate. It should be noted that systems 
are evolving which means that they may get 
exposed to new risks as they evolve over time, 
reviewing and monitoring enable keeping track of 
the changes that systems may undergo. 
Global Safety Management System in the 
Railway Sector 
Definition of a Safety Management System 
Safety management is an important issue in all 
safety critical sectors including railway industry 
and regarded as an important means for improving 
safety culture. 
A safety management system (SMS) is an 
organization‘s formal arrangement, through the 
provision of policies, resources and processes, to 
ensure the safety of its work activity. An effective 
SMS helps the organization to identify and manage 
risks effectively. It allows an organization to 
demonstrate its capability in achieving its safety 
objectives and in meeting regulatory requirements. 
A crucial aspect of safety management activity 
will be the management of interfaces.  
Safety Management System and Lifecycle Stages 
of the Railway Transport System 
The main lifecycle stages of a Railway Transport 
System have been discussed in European norms 
and other similar documents, a schematic view of 
this is presented in Figure. 
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Mainly, the SMS framework focuses on generic 
management issues. Its actual effectiveness very 
much depends on how this framework is applied to 
the specific business processes related to the 
systems, subsystems and equipment the duty 
holder controls. There should be specific elements 
of any developed SMS that deal with aspects of 
each of the following stages of the Railway 
Transport System lifecycle: 
• Pre-operation: Safety approval, system 
handover and acceptance are therefore crucial 
interfaces between the developer and the 
duty-holder that need to be managed 
effectively to ensure safety. The duty-holders 
need to assure themselves that the system 
development has been undertaken in a 
manner that is consistent with the risk 
tolerability criteria set for this overall 
Railway Transport System SMS framework. 
This assurance will be supported evidence of 
application of a robust development process 
such as that described in safety CENELEC 
standards or equivalent. By This approach 
implies that the developer should be aware of 
the risk tolerability criteria. The duty-holder 
must also assure itself that the overall system, 
within which any procured element is to be 
used, remains safe. Each duty holder should 
have in place necessary arrangements for 
accepting new components. This should 
ensure that only ‗operationally ready‘ 
equipments, subsystems or systems are 
accepted for operational usage. The 
acceptance criteria used for such purposes 
should comply with EU and national 
requirement, and their integration and 
commissioning procedures with the Railway 
Transportation System should be identified. 
• Operation: The duty holder should have the 
necessary arrangements for identifying the 
operating requirements of the equipment, 
subsystems and systems it controls. They 
should include requirements and constraints 
for their normal and degraded modes of 
operation. Generally, regulations, rulebooks 
and work procedures provide detailed 
instructions for performing critical 
operations. The duty holder organization 
should specify how these rulebooks are to be 
developed, how the rules will be formulated, 
written and approved; how the use of rules 
will be monitored and, where appropriate, 
how the rules will be enforced or modified 
and maintained to improve their 
performances. 
• Maintenance: A duty holder should have 
adequate arrangements for implementing 
planned and preventative maintenance 
(including, where appropriate, maintenance 
based on monitoring of equipment condition) 
of its equipment, subsystems and systems. 
All such items should be identified, 
prioritized in terms of frequency and standard 
of maintenance and adequate resources 
identified to meet the maintenance schedules. 
The procedures for removing items from the 
operation and for preparing them for 
maintenance should be identified. Similarly, 
procedures for commissioning and accepting 
repaired items for operational use should be 
identified. 
• Renewal: A duty-holder should have 
necessary arrangements for identifying and 
planning renewal work which it has to 
undertake for regulatory or business reasons. 
For example, for maintaining performance 
level a duty holder may need to carry out like 
for like replacement for time-expired assets, 
or introduce new technology to improve 
performance. There should be procedures for 
monitoring critical items and preparing plans 
for their timely replacement. 
A key source of risk is at the transition between 
lifecycle phases, e.g. the resumption of operations 
after a period of maintenance. Lifecycle transition 
should be explicitly addressed in risk assessment 
activity. It is assumed that all the concerned work 
places, e.g. operational area, maintenance depot 
and project site should be subjected to required 
Health and Safety at Work regulations. 
Integrating the suggested Risk Management 
Framework into Railway Safety Management 
System 
Table shows the proposed eleven elements of the 
SMS that are divided into two parts: Planning and 
risk control system and learning system. This 
organization of SMS structure should be refined at 
Stakeholders level and should consider the 
operation, maintenance and renewal phases of the 
life cycle of the railway system and lifecycle 
transition should be explicitly considered in risk 
assessment activity.  
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Risk Assessment for Level Crossings: Application 
to a Moroccan Level Crossing 
Description of the system understudy 
A level crossing (LC) is an intersection between 
the road and the railway that allows vehicles of 
any type to pass through it. The ―danger zone‖ is 
the area of the intersection in which a collision 
between the incoming train and LC road users 
(vehicles and pedestrians crossing the LC) can take 
place. LCs differs in the protection they offer 
users, their degree of usage, and in the speed and 
frequency of the trains that pass over them. LCs 
are categorized into active crossings where the 
road user is given a warning of incoming train or 
passive crossings where no warning is provided, 
the responsibility being on the road users to 
determine whether it is safe to cross the LC. 
Moreover, active LCs can be split into two major 
subcategories i.e. manual and automatic LCs. In 
Morocco, the only type of active LC used is the 
manually controlled full-barriers (MCB) which 
will serve as the basis of our risk assessment study. 
The Moroccan LC studied is composed of two rail 
tracks, and is crossed by a two-way road. The LC 
is operated by a LC keeper who is responsible for 
lifting and lowering the mechanical full-barriers 
and also for alerting the different LC actors of the 
presence of danger at the LC. 
Technical characteristics of the Moroccan Level 
Crossings 
The Moroccan national railway organization, 
ONCF, classifies its LCs according to two criteria, 
namely LC moments and their location. The LC 
moment corresponds to the number of trains and 
vehicles (cars and motorcycles) that pass through 
the LC in a 24 hours period: 
LC moment = [Number of trains / 24h] * [Number 
of Vehicles/24h] 
The second criterion, which is related to the 
location of the LC, corresponds to the visibility of 
the incoming train by the vehicles drivers. In fact, 
ONCF defines a sufficient visibility when a person 
being at 5 meters from the nearest rail track and 
whose eye is at one meter from the ground sees the 
complete locomotive (railway engine used to tow 
railway cars), moving at the maximum authorized 
speed, for a period of 20 seconds. 
The ONCF classifies LC with a moment in the 
interval [2000, 5000] and insufficient visibility as 
first category. These first category level crossings 
are manually controlled barriers LC and are the 
subject of our study. 
Railway signaling:  
The railway signals include: 
• A metallic announcing panel made out of 
light-sensitive tapes representing a barrier 
with the LC number at the top of it. This 
panel is placed before and after the LC at a 
distance of 700 m when the authorized train 
speed does not exceed 120 km/h and at 800 m 
when this speed is greater than 120km/h. 
• An « S » panel placed at 300 m before and 
after the LC to remind the train driver that he 
should whistle to alert both the LC keeper 
and the vehicles passing through the LC of its 
incoming. 
• White-painted pylons located at least at 500 
m before and after the LC 
Road signaling: 
There exist two types of road signals, advanced 
signals and position signals: 
• The Advanced Signal is a triangular panel A9 
placed at 150 m from the LC which informs 
the road users that they are approaching a 
MCB LC and that they should decelerate and 
be cautious at the LC. 
• Position Signals are barriers with tapes of 1 
meter length each painted in red and white. 
Incoming Train Detection System-Electro-
Mechanical Detection:  
ONCF is using Electro- Mechanical oriented pedal 
in all Train Detection System (TDS) at manned 
LC. This automated TDS is composed of pedals 
placed at the middle of each rail track of the 
railway 3000 m from the LC. The TDS is directly 
connected via electrical wires to the LC‘s control 
board and when activated the TDS will trigger 
both the audible and visual signals at the LC, 
indicating the direction of the incoming train. 
These devices are installed in a box located at 
proximity from the LC Keeper‘s shelter and the 
barriers so that the LC keeper can hear and see it 
perfectly. When the train passes on the rail track, it 
activates mechanically the pedals, then the road 
signal changes from green to red. The incoming 
train‘s audible announcement can only be turned 
off if both the LC keeper deactivates the system by 
pushing on a button on his control board and the 
pedal is no longer active, train passed the location 
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of the pedals. 
Entities Involved in the Moroccan manually 
controlled full barriers crossings:  
Several entities may impact the normal operations 
of the MCB crossings, including the condition of 
the railway, the condition of the road crossing the 
railway, the condition of level crossing 
mechanisms, the train detection system, the 
transmission/communication system, the road 
signaling, the railway signaling and the level 
crossing human actors which include the train 
driver, the level crossing keeper, the road user and 
the control center operator. 
Modeling operational interactions at the LC 
through functional diagrams: 
Many of the existing hazards at LC may be due to 
operational failures which can be identified by 
building functional diagrams representing the LC 
from different perspective and then identifying 
operational conditions which may lead to 
accidents. These functional diagrams give a visual 
representation of the sequence of events and 
interactions between the different entities involved 
in the LC operations and enable a detailed 
functional understanding of the system. For this 
purpose we built functional diagrams, for the LC 
under study, from the perspectives of the different 
actors in the LC including the LC keeper, the road 
user, the train driver and control center operator. 
Hazard Identification at MCB Moroccan LC 
In order to identify the complete set of hazards 
surrounding the MCB LC under study, we 
considered the different entities involved in the LC 
and the interactions between them described by 
functional diagrams. We also reviewed the 
operational specifications and considered all the 
environment factors around the LC. We considered 
the human and LC interface. We identified several 
hazards that can be classified into one of five 
categories, namely hazards related to the 
environment of the LC which affect visibility of 
LC users, hazards related to technical problems, 
hazards due to non compliance with standards, 
hazards due to the human factors, and the fifth 
category includes all the other hazards. Several 
sub-categories constitute each hazard category. 
After several brainstorming sessions, we identified 
63 potential hazards along the five hazard 
categories. We present in Table a sample of the 
identified hazards. 
 
The pie-chart in Figure  illustrates the distribution 
of the hazards identified by category. According to 
this chart, the hazard categories, ―Human Factors‖ 
and ―Technical Problems‖, with respectively 37% 
and 29% of the overall system hazards identified, 
are the two major hazards that can lead to an 
accident at the MCB LC. Therefore, a detailed 
analysis of both categories was needed to 
understand and identify which actors (people or 
sub-system parts) are responsible for the majority 
of them and to state if some actions can be 
undertaken by the appropriate authorities to reduce 
their impact, as a future step. 
 
Risk Analysis, Evaluation and Treatment at the 
MCB Moroccan LC 
Since we did not have historical data for risk 
analysis, we used the frequency and consequence 
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classification described in Tables to rank each of 
the 63 identified hazards and then categorized 
them based on ALARP principle as explained in 
Table 3. This revealed that 18% of the hazards are 
considered to have negligible risk, 35% have 
tolerable risk and they include mainly technical 
problems related to the train and the TDS. The 
remaining 47% hazards were associated with the 
intolerable risk category, and most of them were 
associated with the human factor and technical 
problems. The next logical step is to take actions to 
remove hazards with potential intolerable risk. 
These actions should target human factors and 
technical problems. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a framework for risk management at 
railways has been studied and integrated into 
global safety management system of railways. 
Furthermore we studied how it was applied to a 
manually controlled full barrier road rail level 
crossing in Morocco. We studied different aspects 
that should be considered during the system 
definition phase where we suggested using 
functional diagrams for modeling operations at LC 
from the perspective of LC actors. It is a critical 
part for risk management and specifically for 
hazard identification where we provided different 
techniques that can be used; our experience shows 
that involvement of all stakeholders is a 
prerequisite to the success to this phase. Initiating 
events can be unveiled through brainstorming 
sessions and FTA can model complex interactions 
of events that have the potential to lead to 
accidents. Risk analysis can then be carried out 
provided that historical LC accident and incident 
data is available to estimate frequencies and 
consequences; ETA is the ideal tool for estimating 
consequences of hazards due to multiple causes. 
The existing risks are then classified and decisions 
are made regarding their tolerability, the ALARP 
principle can serve this purpose. A cost benefit 
analysis then helps prioritize risk treatment actions 
that should target intolerable risks. Control 
mechanisms should be also put in place to assess, 
monitor and review the risk control actions put in 
place. Finally, it is emphasized on the importance 
of having a database of historical accidents and 
incidents at LC for the success and efficiency for 
the suggested framework. 
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